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Abstract
Critical care medicine has expanded the envelope of debilitating
disease through the application of an aggressive and invasive care
plan, part of which is designed to identify and reverse organ
dysfunction before it proceeds to organ failure. For a select patient
population, this care plan has been remarkably successful. But
because patient selection is very broad, critical care sometimes
yields amalgams of life in death: the state of being unable to
participate in human life, unable to die, at least in the traditional
sense. This work examines the emerging paradox of somatic versus
brain death and why it matters to medical science.
“ ’Ere. He says he’s not dead!
Well, he will be soon. He’s very ill.
I’m getting better!
No, you’re not. You’ll be stone dead in a moment.
I can’t take him like that. It’s against regulations. ”
Monty Python and the Holy Grail
In the new millennium, medical advances have changed the
landscape of death by blurring the distinction of not only the
timing but also the nature of death. Before the postmodern
technological revolution, determination of death was simple.
The old adage ‘a person is dead when a physician says so’
was the acceptable standard because the exact moment of
death did not matter. But, as Whetstine’s research shows, in
the age of organ transplantation, recovering living organs
from clinically dead bodies raises conceptual problems [1].
Resuscitative technology can produce deceptive results and
create uncertainty in determining life from death. Consider
the following: in the United States, about 150 legally dead
people are suspended in liquid nitrogen, awaiting a
nanotechnology that will repair their fatal disease and restore
them to life [2,3]. The practice of cryopreserving people
immediately after they have been pronounced medico-legally
dead is called cryonics [4]. A physician will pronounce a
patient using cardio-respiratory criteria, whereupon the
patient is legally dead, and the rules pertaining to procedures
that can be performed change radically, since the individual is
no longer a living patient but declared a corpse. In the initial
cryopreservation protocol, the subject is intubated and
mechanically ventilated, and a highly efficient mechanical
cardiopulmonary resuscitation device reestablishes circu-
lation, thus calling into question the prior declaration of death
using the cardio-respiratory standard. In some cases, the
subject begins to show ‘signs of life’, including pupillary
reaction and spontaneous motion [5]. This raises crucial
questions, such as are such persons alive again, or were
these subjects ever really dead?
The preceding scenario encapsulates our current dilemma of
when and how death occurs, because an authentic death
spiral can progress while support systems preserve some
solid organ function. The traditional definition of death is
generally accepted as ‘the irreversible cessation of the
integrated functioning of the organism as a whole’ [6]. In
other words, when the entity that integrates the rest of the
organism dies, the organism dies with it, even though some of
the cellular or tissue components within may remain
independently viable for a time. Every cell within the organism
does not need to be dead for the organism to be pronounced
dead; only the organ of integration need be. Without this
definition, organ transplantation would be impossible
because putrefaction would be the only benchmark of death.
The brain has been identified as the primary integrator of the
organism as a whole. The President’s Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research defines integration as “brain function
that manifests as physiologic homeostasis” [7]. Thus,
according to this argument, when the brain dies, the
organism as a whole rapidly dis-integrates where the body
can be considered a shell of organs functioning in purpose-
less disharmony. The problem with this definition is that the
brain dies in a progression, not instantaneously or as a
discrete event. Therefore, we cannot necessarily know the
precise point at which integration springs from cellular
function. As Michael Darwin and colleagues [8] have written,
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“It is only the ideologue or the fool who acknowledges noon
and midnight, but denies all the states of light and darkness
that smoothly shade together to create day and night.”
Harris’ work [9] addresses these specific issues of subjective
versus objective knowledge, and also deals with the
philosophy of language and how medical and legal criteria
have attempted to turn fuzzy analog issues into precise, clear-
cut binary information. For example, we have arbitrarily
decided the exact point at which a person becomes
intoxicated and legally incompetent to operate an automobile.
But selecting a particular blood alcohol level does not
absolutely define drunkenness any more than a physician
pronouncing death absolutely defines the exact point of
death. Similarly, speeding is defined as exceeding an agreed
upon, albeit arbitrary, figure. These tactics attempt to render
objective truth from inherently indeterminate and value-laden
terms and are often referred to as ‘legal fictions’. Accordingly,
brain death protocols have evolved to identify patients dead
enough to bury but having organs viable enough for
transplantation [10]. But is whole brain death simply another
legal fiction?
Initially, for an accurate diagnosis of brain death, there must
be clear evidence of an acute, catastrophic, irreversible brain
injury, and any reversible conditions that may obfuscate the
clinical assessment (for example, drug intoxication,
hypothermia, or metabolic abnormalities) must be excluded.
Subsequently, the physical examination must reveal coma,
absent motor responses, absent brain-stem reflexes, and
apnea. Some protocols call for a second examination,
performed after a variable interval. Further confirmatory studies
(for example, electroencephalography (EEG) or cerebral
blood flow studies) may be ordered if there is any ambiguity
in the clinical evaluation though, interestingly, according to
the National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, an
isoelectric EEG is not required for a declaration of brain
death, thus raising further questions as to whether a brain
that can emit 0.2 microvolts of electron potential on EEG
ought to satisfy the criteria for ‘whole’ brain death [11].
Whetstine’s research clearly shows that the term ‘whole’
brain death may in fact be a misnomer. There is evidence that
a dead brain does not necessarily ensure a dead organism
[12-14]. That is, integration often continues in brain dead
patients if artificial interventions are employed. Further, the
notion of ‘whole’ brain death is suspect when the brain can
continue to maintain neurohormonal regulation, as
demonstrated through the absence of diabetes insipidus, and
modulate body temperature [15,16]. Further, patients
certified brain-dead have been maintained on life support for
months to deliver healthy babies, which suggests that the
body may continue integration without aggregate brain input
[17]. Thus, the term whole brain death may not be wholly
accurate, and this imprecision has led to much discussion
about when the brain is ‘dead enough’ to meet the criteria for
the dead donor rule, which stipulates that organ removal may
not cause a person’s death and that vital organs may not be
removed ante-mortem.
The issue of determining death becomes further confused by
the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), which,
ironically, was drafted with the intent to clarify the issue. The
UDDA guidelines declare that either “irreversible cessation of
circulatory functions” or “irreversible cessation of the entire
brain, including brain stem” constitutes death [18]. The
guidelines do not elucidate how these two standards reflect
the same phenomenon; the wording suggests that there are
two kinds of death: brain and cardiac. This lack of a
consistent standard and the intense demand for donor
organs for transplantation have promoted the evolution of a
particular type of organ procurement technique known as
‘donation after cardiac death’ (DCD) that relies solely on the
cessation of cardio-respiratory function without reference to
neurological function.
This dichotomy is controversial. At a strictly functional level, it
can be argued that the heart is irrelevant to the diagnosis of
life or death because it fails the test of integration. The heart’s
only purpose is to pump blood to the brain, generally
considered the integrator of the rest of the body. If cardiac
standstill constitutes death, a patient with a stilled heart
during cardiopulmonary bypass is dead. Alternatively, is a
patient alive when a viable heart beats inside a brain-dead
body?
WH Sweet stated in the New England Journal of Medicine,
“It is clear that a person is not dead unless his brain is dead.
The time honored criteria of the stoppage of the heart beat
and circulation are indicative of death only when they persist
long enough for the brain to die” [19]. In addition, consent for
organ procurement is only a valid criterion after irreversible
death occurs. A patient or his or her family cannot consent to
any procedure that will result in death, nor can the family
consent to the patient’s being dead in a defined number of
minutes as has been suggested by proponents of DCD. To
do so is tantamount to consenting to euthanasia.
A primary problem with the determination of death is the
inability to establish precisely when it transitions from a
reversible process to an irreversible event. Despite the
UDDA’s requirement that death must be irreversible, it failed
to define the term and several ideological caucuses have
developed, each with its own perspective. One caucus says
that death is irreversible when the patient cannot
“spontaneously” resuscitate. But how long does one have to
wait to be sure that auto-resuscitation will not occur? Long
enough for death of a quorum of cells? Another caucus says
that death is irreversible when the patient cannot be
resuscitated by any means or when resuscitation fails. Does
this mean that every dying patient must be assaulted by every
possible intervention if he or she is to be proven dead? APage 3 of 3
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third caucus says that irreversibility occurs when the inherent
order of the atoms that make up the brain are irrevocably
destroyed. If the atomic structure of the brain is disturbed but
the structural integrity of the brain is maintained, there is no
fundamental barrier, given our current understanding of
physical law, to recovering its information content, however
labor-intensive that might be. However, if brain ultrastructure
is physically destroyed, the laws of thermodynamics say that
the information is irreversibly destroyed. With that considera-
tion of irreversibility in mind, is a tobacco mosaic virus ‘dead’
if its constituent parts can be broken up and shaken into
solution and then self-assemble again into a viable virus
capable of self-replication?
Some believe that any meaningful definition of death must take
into account such an information-theory criterion. Because the
definition of death hinges on irreversibility and the brain is a
material system governed by physical laws, physics may
provide the ultimate definition of irreversibility. Cryptographer
and nanotechnologist Ralph Merkle noted, “The difference
between information theoretic death and clinical death is as
great as the difference between turning off a computer and
dissolving that computer in acid. A computer that has been
turned off, or even dropped out the window of a car at 90
miles per hour, is still recognizable. The parts, though broken
or even shattered, are still there. While the short-term memory
in a computer is unlikely to survive such mistreatment, the
information held on disk will survive. Even if the disk is bent or
damaged, we could still read the information by examining the
magnetization of the domains on the disk surface. It’s not
functional, but full recovery is possible” [20].
The problems set out here remain unresolved but will
assuredly be brought to the fore as transplantation demands
allow for greater interpretation of the definition and criteria of
death. If our definition and criteria remain conceptually and
clinically confused, we risk acceding to the authoritarian
adage that death occurs when a physician says so without
sufficient justification. The moment of death is unknown, but
we are obligated to wrestle with these issues if we hope to
differentiate the dead from the imminently dying.
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